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Figures like these underpin the importance of food 
supply as a tool for gaining popular support. The Roman 
Annona is perhaps an early example of such an overt attempt 
by the authorities to ‘buy’ the support from the masses- 
however temporary that may be (Toussaint-Samat, 2009).
As in any undertaking food is crucial because the lack of 
it prohibits the pursuit of success. Revolutionary groups are 
subject to this as much as anyone. If the group is small, to 
prosper it will need to have the goodwill of a support 
community prepared to hide and feed them and provide 
other essential logistical supports. This cannot be achieved 
without the group having a common cause with the host 
community. If the group is substantial in number then they 
will have to requisition stores and foodstuffs from the 
populace at large and this has the potential for causing the 
host community to turn against the armed revolutionary 
group. Therefore both situations are open to potential 
problems. A third scenario is one by which the armed 
revolutionary group liberates territory and the burden of 
provisioning both guerrillas and civilians fall to it as it has 
to behave as a de facto government with all the attendant 
logistical issues that comes with it; not least the inevitable 
conversion of important members of the group from 
military cadres to civilian functionaries. This essentially 
dilutes the group’s capability for armed struggle.
This research project has, by necessity, relied on a wide 
ranging selection of secondary sources which has informed 
the direction of this paper.  It studies provisioning within 
revolutionary movements with the aim of investigating the 
food pathway used by revolutionaries under arms. The 
immensely broad nature of such an undertaking has 
suggested a narrower focus and this has led to the author to 
decide to investigate two very different types of 
revolutionary warfare:
Rural Guerrilla War as exemplified by the Cuban 
revolutionary war by the 26th of July Movement and their 
‘Jungle War’ in the Sierra Maestra mountains in the 1950s 
or the Khmer Rouges in Cambodia in the 1970s and the 
PLAF (Viet Cong) in Vietnam in the 1960/70s. These 
revolutionary armies had different pressures on their food 
provisioning – sometimes they had conquered territory and 
were often acting as de facto governments or in contrast to 
that were a jungle -or wilderness-based army who emerged 
to attack the enemy and then melt back into the wild.
Urban Guerrilla War as exemplified by armed 
insurrectionary groups such as the I.R.A. since the early 
nineteen hundreds and the Rote Armee Fraktion (Baader-
Meinhof) (RAF) in 1970’s and 80’s.  This is necessarily 
characterised by the anonymity of the revolutionary cadres 
Revolution: ‘A forcible overthrow of a government 
or social order, in favour of a new system’ (Pearsall 
2001, p.1590).
The historian Norman Davies describes the defeat of a 
Napoleonic army in 1808 in Andalusia by a band of 
‘guerrilla fighters’ as showing ‘…how small bands of 
determined fighters could contest the overwhelming force 
of a professional army’ (Davies 1997, p.736).
The eventual surrender of 22,000 French soldiers was a 
shock to conventional military logic and Davies goes on to 
say (Davies 1997, p.736):
The guerrillas of Napoleonic Spain have had many 
heirs, not least in the popular heroes of colonial wars 
and the back-wood revolutionaries of Latin 
America. But they have had their disciples in Europe 
as well – in the Russian anarchists, in the partisans 
and the maquisards of the Anti-Nazi Resistance 
Movement, and, with the IRA or ETA, in the ‘urban 
guerrillas’ of modern political terrorism.
Revolution and food are inextricably linked. The need 
for food that supplies basic nutritional values to the masses 
has been at the heart of many political upheavals; notably 
the French Revolution in 1789 where the price and/or 
scarcity of bread/grain led the ragged underclass to 
challenge the power of the absolute monarch Louis XVI 
which culminated in the overthrow and execution of the 
king and the eventual downfall of the Ancien Regime. In 
Russia in 1917 one of the sparks to revolution was the 
inability of the authorities to provide bread for the 
populace; the experience of spending forty hours a week 
(Laudan, 2013) queuing (sometimes unsuccessfully) for 
bread after have completed a week’s manual labour was just 
too much for the urban industrial working-class women 
and soon transformed into radical street protests. 
The important role that adequate food provisioning by 
the authorities plays can also be a buffer to armed 
insurrection as the situation in Syria in 2016 shows. The 
Ba’ath-ist regime had long subsidised bread, which is a 
staple in the Arab world and when the regime lost control 
of the wheat producing areas to ISIS forces, they were 
quick to react and immediately started importing wheat 
from Russia and Ukraine in order to maintain the flow of 
subsidised bread to the populace and thereby presumably 
the popular support of the masses, (www.bbc.com, 2016). 
The war-time price increase of bread in regime-held areas is 
230%; this contrasts with non-regime-held areas where the 
increase has been 6500% in some cases. 
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• Khmer Rouges: Cambodian revolutionary group led by 
Pol Pot. After a long jungle war they took power and 
ruled from 1975-1979.
• N.L.F. (National Liberation Front): Vietnamese 
political organisation dedicated to re-unification of 
Vietnam aka Viet Cong.
• P.L.A. (People’s Liberation Army): Chinese armed 
forces originally the military wing of the Chinese 
Communist Party, participated inter alia in the Civil 
war and Long March.
• P.L.A.F. (People’s Liberation Armed Forces): Military 
wing of the Viet Cong. With the North Vietnamese 
armed forces, they were ultimately responsible for the 
victory against the U.S. backed alliance that supported 
the puppet regime in South Vietnam.
• R.A.F. (Rote Armee Fraktion / Red Army Faction): 
Armed Marxist group based mostly in West Germany 
and after reunification, Germany. Active between 1970 
and 1998, often referred to as the Baader-Meinhof 
group after two prominent founder-members.
• Red Army: Founded by Leon Trotsky. De Facto armed 
forces of the Soviet Union from 1917 onwards, 
responsible for the liberation of Russia from Tsarist rule.
•  RZ (Revolutionäre Zellen /Revolutionary Cells):  A Rote 
Armee Fraktion affiliate in West Germany in the 1970’s
In the city
The history of Ireland is characterised by uprisings, 
revolutions and rebellions against British rule and every 
century has seen a serious attempt at obtaining freedom by 
force of arms. 
In the Seamus Heaney poem ‘Requiem for the Croppies’ 
(1966) which deals with the battle of Vinegar Hill in 
Wexford in 1798, the decisive engagement of the United 
Irishmen rebellion of that year, Heaney refers to the 
absence of field kitchens and the rebougeel’s habit of 
carrying barley in their pockets whilst conducting a 
guerrilla war through ‘hedge and ditch’. The poem’s 
melancholy climax then speaks of the thousands of rebels 
killed and barley (from the pockets of dead rebels) growing 
out their graves (Heaney, 2010).
The pockets of our greatcoats full of barley… 
No kitchens on the run, no striking camp… 
We moved quick and sudden in our own country. 
The priest lay behind ditches with the tramp. 
A people hardly marching… on the hike… 
We found new tactics happening each day: 
We’d cut through reins and rider with the pike 
and stampede cattle into infantry, 
then retreat through hedges where cavalry must be 
thrown. 
Until… on Vinegar Hill… the final conclave. 
Terraced thousands died, shaking scythes at 
cannon. 
and the need for them to fit into the background of society 
often using safe houses and other counter-surveillance 
techniques to avoid detection. This lifestyle is fraught with 
danger and food provisioning as a daily essential poses 
many barriers.
The shift from guerrilla war from its largely rural setting 
to a largely urban setting came about from the 1960’s 
onwards, inspired and motivated by the failures and 
successes of the post-Cuban missions of Ernesto ‘Che’ 
Guevara and was best exemplified by the concept of foco. 
The Spanish word means focus and in revolutionary theory, 
refers to the concept of armed revolutionary groups 
focussing their efforts on specific targets rather than 
full-scale military encounters with the authorities. This can 
be summed up as a policy of hit-and-run and represents the 
huge leap made by insurrectionaries from living outside 
society as armed revolutionaries to living within society as 
armed revolutionaries.
Provisioning an army of revolutionary cadres, hundreds 
or even thousands strong, is not easily achieved and despite 
the disparity in numbers, the same is equally true of small 
‘cells’ of Stadtgeurillas in their urban setting. 
Glossary of terms
• 26th of July Movement: Cuban revolutionary 
organisation founded in Mexico by Fidel Castro and 
others. After a two year jungle war they eventually 
overthrew the dictatorship of Fulgencio Batista in 1959.
• Armée Revolutionnaire: Formed to perform grain 
requisitioning and political commissary (food 
provisioning) work during the French Revolution.
• Campesinos: Latin American term for subsistence 
farmers who own very small plots of land.
• Foco: The concept of guerrilla warfare devised by 
French author Regis Debray. Based on his observations 
in Latin America in the 1960’s, it is a policy of hit and 
run which moves the revolutionary cadre from the 
jungle to the city, as the concept relies on engaging 
popular support for a small group through revolutionary 
action.
• Food Army: Armed battalions founded by the 
Bolsheviks with specific responsibility for food 
provisioning during the Russian Revolution and Civil 
War, operated under the command of regional 
procurement committees.
• FSLN Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional 
(Sandinista National Liberation Front
• I.R.A. (Irish Republican Army): Armed irredentist 
group in Ireland, they sporadically attempt to subvert 
British rule in Northern Ireland – Sometimes referred 
to as the ‘Provisional’ I.R.A.
• ISIS: Armed Islamic group fighting in Syria and Iraq 
with the aim of the overthrow of those legally 
constituted governments and replacing them with an 
Islamic Caliphate.
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Food and rations in the College like in the other 
garrisons around the city were scare. Food could 
only be obtained by tunnelling from house to house 
between the College and Grafton Street. Mary 
Donnelly was one of the women given the onerous 
task of foraging for food.
Most garrisons used female volunteers for food foraging 
and this was based on the precept that the British were less 
likely to shoot women out of hand if found at large outside 
the immediate combat zone.
Mary Donnelly a volunteer in 1916 said of her time in the 
Royal College of Surgeons during the Rising (Shannon, 2006):
As each house was taken it had to be guarded and 
this meant that food had to be carried under fire 
from the lane beside the College and through rough 
holes in walls where a bullet through the window 
on landings threatened us as we clambered up 
assisted by the men on guard in these lonely houses. 
A big fire was lit in the fireplace of one of the large 
classrooms to the rear of the College, which was 
used to make porridge when eventually some 
oatmeal was delivered to the garrison. According to 
Countess Markievicz, ‘on Tuesday and Wednesday 
we were absolutely starved. In the beginning men 
coming off guard could only get a few cream 
crackers, supplied by McDonagh from Jacob’s 
factory, before trying to get some sleep.’
To the hungry volunteers, porridge and cream crackers 
may have seemed like a feast but the absence of a serious 
attempt to collect food supplies left the individual 
garrisons living hand-to-mouth for the duration of Easter 
week with varying degrees of success.
The General Post Office was the central location of the 
Uprising and contained the Provisional Government 
headed by P.H. Pearse and others. After one hundred years 
of analysis and scrutiny, it is still not clear what the rebels 
hoped to achieve, but an indication of possible intent can be 
seen by the order below issued and signed by Pearse himself 
which ordered volunteers to bring only eight hours rations.
The volunteer to whom this order was issued mobilised 
at Rathfarnham Chapel in the southern suburbs of the city 
(Fig. 1). We can surmise that the volunteer then marched 
to one of the city-centre locations to man the barricades 
and participate in the fighting all with no more than eight 
hours rations which seems very little for men embarking 
upon war with no prospect of replenishing their supplies 
other than foraging. Furthermore there is evidence that 
within the command structure of the G.P.O. there was an 
over-zealous rationing policy in place. 
Other garrisons fared better as they sent foraging parties 
out early and were not so centrally located. A case in point 
is the South Dublin Union which was commanded by 
Éamonn Ceannt. The garrison under his command faced 
similar food provisioning problems but were alleviated by 
The hillside blushed, soaked in our broken wave. 
They buried us without shroud or coffin 
and in August… the barley grew up out of our 
grave.’
The poem may be considered a metaphor for food 
provisioning, as again and again in Irish history the armed 
insurgency can be seen to be accompanied by little 
planning for food. 
The most celebrated event in Irish political history is 
usually considered to be the Easter Rising of 1916; often 
just referred to as ‘Easter’ or ‘1916 or ‘the rising’’. The 
events of Easter week provide an insight into the mind-set 
of the leadership, who were intent on making the gesture of 
defiance towards The British Empire, yet gave little or no 
thought to the day to day provisioning of the volunteers 
under their command. 
The Easter Rising was conducted mostly but not 
exclusively in Dublin where the rebels seized a number of 
strategically located buildings and fortified them. They 
were effectively in their home city and the idea of 
occupying fixed positions against a militarily superior 
enemy was a poor choice when contrasted with the urban 
guerrilla warfare model that was subsequently employed 
during the War for Independence (1919-1921). The main 
rebel positions were the Royal College of Surgeons, St. 
Stephens Green, The Four Courts, and Boland’s Mill, The 
G.P.O. and the South Dublin Union.
All these positions, with the exception of St. Stephens 
Green, an open air park, were buildings in urban or 
inner-city Dublin. The rebels barricaded themselves in and 
waited for the inevitable British response. As any military 
undertaking requires military ordnance the rebel 
leadership prudently gave thought to guns and 
ammunition, which had occupied much of their pre-rising 
efforts which saw guns landed in Howth Co. Dublin and 
Kilcoole Co. Wicklow, however the provision of food 
which is an essential seems to have been overlooked or at 
best was an afterthought.
The garrison at St. Stephens Green was perhaps the most 
exposed of all rebel positions therefore a lack of food could 
not be easily remedied as they were surrounded by the 
British, yet it seems from the start they suffered severe 
shortages( O’Brien, 2013):
Food was still scarce, and continued to be rationed. 
Many of the Volunteers collapsed at their posts 
from lack of sustenance and had to be removed to 
the sick bay. Commandant Mallin detailed a unit to 
go through all the buildings in his perimeter and 
search for supplies. This resulted in some finds, but 
the lack of food was to remain a problem in the 
coming days.
This was by no means restricted to the St. Stephens 
Green outpost, the nearest garrison was the Royal College 
of Surgeons (Shannon, 2006):
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day-to-day food needs, whether it was for a two day mission 
in West Cork or reconnaissance duty in Dublin.
The flying columns were highly mobile ad hoc grouping of 
riflemen used to operating in rural areas often with the tacit 
approval and support of the populace at large, these were 
highly successful in the war and were provisioned by their 
own families and the goodwill of neighbours (Barry, 2010).
The most famous of the flying columns was the West Cork 
Brigade commanded by General Commandant Tom Barry. 
The West Cork Brigade numbered 310 men and it required 
12,500 British military personnel to enforce the Pax Brittanica 
in the region. Feeding 310 occasional soldiers was not an easy 
task and Barry’s men had to take every opportunity to supply 
themselves. On one occasion when some of them occupied a 
‘big house’ belonging to a local Crown sympathiser, the 
volunteers appeared to take great delight in plundering the 
food stores. He recalls that there was: 
… four rashers and four fried eggs for every man.
And that:
…the volunteers appeared to enjoy their first 
experience of eating at the expense of one of their 
enemies (Barry 2010, p.80).
The resourcefulness of these volunteers was a quality much 
needed in a military theatre that has even less certainties 
than conventional war.
Irish independence was achieved in 1922 with the 
foundation of the Irish Free State; however the six north 
easternmost counties had been retained under British Rule. 
As a result, the Irish guerrilla war was continued albeit on a 
smaller scale and now republican activists faced imprisonment 
from their fellow Irishmen. During World War II, the Irish 
State imprisoned a large number of republican activists, 
some were detained without trial and some were tried and 
sentenced for various crimes. 
Brendan Behan the famous poet and playwright was a 
member of the I.R.A and was imprisoned a number of 
times by the authorities. His description of going on the 
run in the 1940’s in an attempt to evade capture details his 
use of a ‘safe-house’ where an elderly republican 
sympathiser feeds and hides him and his colleague 
overnight (Behan 1991, p.38):
… she took us in and gives us this plate of bacon and 
cabbage, which was her own dinner for sure, as she 
would hardly be likely to have food enough for 
herself, let alone to spare, and a glass of porter … 
and Jesus, Mary and Joseph wasn’t she apologising 
for the sparsity of it all?
Behan and a colleague continue to avoid arrest and after 
a spell in Belfast they attempt to re-join their units in 
Dublin. On reaching a pub on the Dublin county border 
Behan and his comrade order (Behan 1991, p.43):
A pint of stout myself. A Pint of stout?… So we had the 
pint of stout and a crubeen each and a plate of bread and 
the fortunate capture during ambush of a delivery boy and 
his cargo of ten chickens. The same garrison were also lucky 
in that the next day they captured three calves. The South 
Dublin Union, a workhouse, had the added advantage of 
having volunteer Bob Holland in their group who was a 
butcher by trade. They also had a ‘head cook’ within their 
ranks and so had the expertise needed to feed the 
volunteers using the workhouse kitchen. This helped the 
supply of adequate nutrition but did not stop individual 
volunteers from consuming their rations at will. One 
volunteer named Thomas Young ate 48 hours rations in ten 
minutes according to himself. 
Other volunteers complained in retrospect that despite 
the rebellion happening in their own city and its leaders 
having perhaps twelve months’ notice of it that there were 
no plans made to provide adequate food supplies.
In Jacobs’s factory the volunteers were entirely without 
food and again relied on female volunteers to forage for 
food. One forager found slabs of cooking chocolate and 
distributed them amongst the volunteers. The female 
foragers in this garrison also shared their meagre supplies 
with the garrison at the Royal College of Surgeons where it 
was reported that some female volunteers were passing out 
through hunger (and no doubt fatigue) (Townsend, 2006).
The experience of fighting from fixed positions and the 
subsequent ease with which the British regained control of 
the city was a lesson well learned by the Irish rebels and by 
the time the Easter Rising was over and the leaders had 
been executed, the younger generation of rebel leaders were 
getting ready to try again.
In contrast, the subsequent War for Independence was 
characterised as having almost no full scale military 
engagements and marked a shift towards modern guerrilla 
warfare. The tactics of hit-and-run were adopted and thus the 
necessity for rebels to melt into the background of society 
became paramount. The method of warfare had changed and 
so had the method of provisioning the combatants.
The new type of warfare was typified by the flying 
columns in the rural areas and by small hit squads in the 
urban areas. These two different types of approach required 
the revolutionaries to take personal responsibility for their 
Fig. 1 Mobilisation order signed by P.H. Pearse.
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In claustrophobic West Berlin the sharing of accommodation 
was more commonplace and the cause of disputes. On one 
occasion hungry cadres devoured a colleague’s wife’s plum 
cake in its entirety, causing the colleague to question the 
movement’s living arrangements, particularly the lack of 
comfort available (Becker, 1978). In an attempt to 
provision themselves more suitably the cadres bought small 
gas stoves both for heating and cooking, this however was 
not always utilised for food purposes as the revolutionaries 
often ended up eating ‘…bread and sausage’ and drinking 
Coke and Cognac (Becker 1978, p. 241).
The theme of food as a source of dispute and lack of 
comfort resurfaced when some of the group’s senior cadres 
were at a training camp in Jordan run by a Palestinian 
group where they were fed basic rations which were not 
popular (Aust 2008, p. 67):
They were served the scanty food on which the 
Palestinians had been living for years: canned meat 
donated by UNRRA, the United Nations refugee 
relief organisation, generally mixed with rice. With 
it they got flat cakes of Arab bread, water, fruit only 
occasionally, fresh meat never. The Germans did 
not like this diet, and complained from the start.
Despite their haphazard approach to provisioning 
themselves, the RAF as a group understood the importance 
of food as a means of building support amongst the wider 
populace and one method used was to offer poor people state 
benefits without the usual bureaucracy. In short they forged 
food vouchers and distributed them amongst poor and 
homeless families; this largesse was also extended to transit 
passes for bus, tram and rail (Smith & Moncourt, 2009).
Between urban and rural
Any revolution will need a supply of food but the greater 
the number of revolutionaries the greater the problems of 
creating a viable supply-chain. This can be seen by 
examining two large-scale revolutions, namely the French 
Revolution of 1789 & the Russian Revolution of 1917.
These had many common points, including the near-
starvation of the urban poor and the contrasting luxury in 
which the royal families were perceived to have lived being 
a major catalyst for uprising in both cases. Food as the 
cause of uprising is further developed when the actions of 
the above revolutionary governments regarding food supply 
are examined. 
Both the French and the Bolshevik revolutionary 
governments chose not only to ration food but also create 
specialist military groups to collect, transport and 
distribute foodstuffs. The French created the Armée 
Revolutionnaire to carry out commissary duties i.e. to 
provision the cities especially Paris by marching into rural 
areas and collecting agricultural produce. The necessity for 
this was shown by the pre-revolutionary guerre de farines 
(Flour War) of 1774 (Wright 1974, p. 27):
butter, and the steaming hot pig’s foot warmed us up for 
the road and what we might have to face out there.
The use of safe houses continues but eventually the net 
closes on Behan and he is arrested in Dublin’s inner-city whilst 
stretching his legs after a breakfast of (Behan, 1991, p.47):
…a kipper, some mushrooms, tea with bread and 
marmalade and butter…
Behan was eventually sentenced to fourteen years 
imprisonment and as a political prisoner was locked up 
with other members of the I.R.A. in the internment camp 
in The Curragh where the prisoners were issued foodstuffs 
and given access to kitchens and largely fended for 
themselves. After a government amnesty which led to the 
release of hundreds of these I.R.A. prisoners Behan is 
transferred to a smaller holding facility with twenty-one 
other republican detainees. He notes that the cooking is 
better as it (Behan  1991, p.74):
…was now done by professional Free State Army 
cooks rather than our own boys who had sketchy 
ideas about what constituted cooking.
In an Irish context the use of the safe house was to 
continue as a feature of armed rebellion for decades more 
until the eventual ceasefire that came with the Good Friday 
Agreement in 1998.
The urban guerrilla must know how to live among 
the people, and he must be careful not to appear 
strange and different from ordinary city life 
(Marighella 2008, p.6).
The safe house and self-provisioning was heavily used in 
West Germany in the 1970’s by the Rote Armee Fraktion 
(RAF). The West German authorities called them the 
Baader-Meinhof Gruppen and this grouping were born out 
of student protests in the late 1960’s, eventually 
transforming into an armed insurrectionary movement. 
The tactics of the RAF were straightforward; they lived in 
safe houses or squats/ communes and effectively lived 
‘below the radar’ appearing as typical young students to the 
outside world whilst waging an urban guerrilla war against 
the Bund which including bank robberies, kidnappings, 
assassinations and other subversive activities.
The food provisioning in the communes was similar to a 
student house activity; a weekly shop was done and all 
participants helped out with the cooking. The need to 
appear unremarkable was essential so often the group took 
short lets in major cities such as Frankfurt, Cologne and 
Hamburg – houses rented as holiday lets or exam study 
centres for students. The similarity to the clichéd student 
house is striking. As one describes the atmosphere and 
décor as (Becker 1978, p. 222):
…bare floorboards and bricks and planks … no 
tablecloth … eating and drinking consisted of beer 
and coffee and smoking cigarettes.
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Army’. This adjunct of the military numbered 76,000 
strong and took the initiative by forcibly seizing grain and 
other food supplies all over the Soviet Union. It was 
characterised by ‘The battle for grain’, exemplified by 
armed brigades sent to countryside to requisition grain 
from the rural peasantry by force (Figes, 1996).
As Civil War raged, the Food Army was divided into 
‘food brigades’ who did the physical and sometimes 
unpleasant work in conjunction with locally organised 
party-inspired Committees of the Rural Poor. Later the 
Bolsheviks introduced a ‘food levy’ which included not 
only grains but all foodstuffs in order to provision the 
urban populace during the ongoing civil war. In order to 
safeguard the food supply to the cities, the Bolsheviks 
examined how to guarantee nutritional minimums to the 
populace and developed the idea of rationing.
The introduction of the ration coupon became an 
important tool in the war against mass starvation and by 
1920 the Soviet state was feeding thirty million urban 
citizens via the implementation of work-place canteens (Figes, 
1996, p. 727) – an impressive feat considering the civil war 
and the attendant difficulties it posed to food provisioning.
The rural situation during the revolution was later dealt 
with by the Bolsheviks by the collectivisation of agriculture, 
which in theory would lead the rural peasants to a better 
resolution than the previous situation which left them 
vulnerable to the vicissitudes of the market-based economy. It 
would be decades before the urban peasantry contemplated 
collectivisation with anything approaching support.
The urban situation is contextualised by Carlos 
Marighella shortly before his death in 1969 where he 
highlights the differences in tactics needed by 
revolutionaries in which he says conventional logistics 
require, food, fuel, equipment and ammunition 
(Marighella, 2008).
Marighella places a high degree of importance to food, 
and goes on to point out the differences between 
conventional armed forces and guerrilla forces 
(Marighellea 2008, p. 13): 
Conventional logistics refer to the maintenance 
problems for an army or a regular armed force, 
transported in vehicles, with fixed bases and supply 
lines. Urban guerrillas, on the contrary, are not an 
army but small armed groups, intentionally 
fragmented. They have neither vehicles nor rear 
areas. Their supply lines are precarious and 
insufficient, and they have no fixed bases.
Therefore the urban guerrilla group is essentially a 
smaller, clandestine movement which requires less formal 
supply lines yet needs to eat each day.
Welcome to the jungle
The enduring image conjured up by the words guerrilla 
warfare are perhaps the jungle-based endeavours of the 
Bread prices increased to starvation levels and 
created widespread unrest, resulting in attacks on 
granaries …and rioting against bakers, farmers, 
corn dealers, game laws and royal taxes.
In 1793, Robespierre, a senior member of the revolutionary 
government demanded that an Armée Revolutionnaire be 
formed with specific responsibility for collecting grain from 
peasants in the rural areas. This Armée was to be constituted 
from the ranks of the urban sans-culottes. This idea of 
provisioning the revolutionary masses in the cities by 
re-distributing the surplus grain being hoarded by avaricious 
peasants is one that has a resonance beyond the French 
Revolution and re-appears throughout revolutionary movements 
in many different eras with strong echoes of later soviet 
collectivisation. The French revolutionary government instituted 
central requisitioning and the Armée Revolutionnaire report to 
the general assembly on March 16th, 1794, highlighted the 
importance of provisioning the revolution (Wright 1974, p. 134):
From the moment we have arrived here, we have 
been occupied in arranging the provisioning of 
Paris, several of our comrades, in the course of their 
duties, have found eggs and butter hidden in the 
cupboards in farmhouses and even grain hidden in 
barrels … We ask that we be allowed to requisition 
food and bring it to Paris.
In a report from Cityoen Le Grand who was a 
revolutionary sent on a mission to Normandy specifically 
charged with finding food supplies for Paris, he comments 
that people are exhausted by’…the excessive increases in the 
price of basic necessities and, even more so., by the rarity 
and poor quality of bread…’ (Wright 1974, p. 128).
The Russian situation one hundred and twenty-odd 
years later bore striking similarities, as shown by the bread 
shortages in the urban areas prior to the October 
revolution (Figes 1996, p. 605):
It all began with bread. For several weeks the 
bakeries in Petrograd had been running out, 
especially in the workers’ districts…the average 
worker consumed fewer than 2,000 calories a day- 
less than half the recommended intake.
Figes discusses the breakdown of the market between 
urban and rural areas and says: ‘…the real root of the urban 
crisis was the peasantry’s reluctance to sell foodstuffs for 
paper money’ (1996, p. 608). This reluctance to exchange 
goods for Soviet-issued currency can be viewed as the 
peasantry ‘hedging their bets’ as to the outcome of the civil 
war which was raging between the Red Army and the 
Tsarist ‘White’ Army at the time.
In 1920, the Bolshevik government, in a move towards 
the ideal of a planned economy, took the first steps towards 
universal state rationing. The Bolsheviks had decreed that 
all surplus grain was to become the property of the state 
and to expedite the collection; they formed the ‘Food 
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In terms of accessing foodstuffs, Guevara insisted that if 
the group were operating outside a ‘liberated zone’, then 
any foodstuffs taken from the populace should be ‘paid’ for 
by issuing of promissory notes and that a genuine attempt 
to redeem the note in full or part should be made, and 
sooner rather than later. This attitude was shared by other 
rebel commanders as Fidel Castro, the leader of the 
revolution says (Castro 2007, p. 214):
We paid the Campesinos with what very little we 
had for every single thing we got from them, even if 
they if they didn’t want to accept it, and we paid 
them, I assure you, at a higher-than-market price.
As Marxists, the ideology of Castro and Guevara was 
one of class war and they were careful to foster good 
relations with the poor agricultural peasants and 
Campesinos and it was important for the guerrillas to be 
seen as the friend of the poor. This explains the insistence 
on ‘paying’ for requisitioned stores.
Guevara further instigated a tax on farmers in rebel-held 
zones. He imposed a tax on the sugar plantations and cattle 
ranchers which may have been a move designed to elicit 
food instead of cash, which was of more use to his group at 
that time (Guevara, 2009).
The difference between operating in enemy controlled 
zones and ‘liberated’ zones were stark as seen by the 
following statements (Reid-Henry 2009, p. 168): 
El Hombrito – Che’s zone as commandant had a 
micro-state feel with its own Radio Rebelde and its 
own news-sheet and crucially its own bread oven.
Contrasted with life in enemy territory: ‘…on the push west 
which eventually would lead to the spreading of the 
insurrection throughout the entire island, Guevara’s 
column battle poor conditions and as well as the regime 
and at point have only enough food to eat … once every two 
days’ (Reid-Henry 2009, p. 189).
The inclusion of the agricultural peasants as part of a de 
facto support network was a tactic used elsewhere such as 
the Cuban-inspired Nicaraguan revolution by FSLN 
guerrillas in the 1970’s. The Sandinistas, like their Cuban 
counterparts, were heavily committed to agrarian reform 
and early FSLN actions were reliant on peasant 
participation (Collins et al, 1982, p. 22):
Both Campesinos (owners of small plots of land) 
and landless agricultural workers joined the 
guerrillas. One of the earliest attacks on the 
National Guard was carried out by a Sandinista 
guerrilla column made up totally of small farmers 
and landless workers under the direction of Colonel 
Santos Lopez…
Guevara left Cuba in the 1960’s after the success of the 
revolution and dedicated his life to revolutions elsewhere. 
It was in his final campaign in Bolivia that he died, but his 
Cuban Revolution or the decades-long Vietnam War, both 
of which ended in military defeat for the conventional 
armed forces. The difference between this war by guerrillas 
on a grand scale and the hit-and-run tactics of the urban 
equivalent is one of scale, exacerbated by the need to feed 
large numbers of combatants and often assorted support 
personnel and in some cases the need to take on the role of 
administration in captured/ liberated territories.
This has been was written about at length by Dr. 
Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara in a number of books, notably The 
Reminiscences of the Cuban Revolutionary War, Bolivian 
Diary and Guerrilla Warfare. 
Guevara led a column of the Cuban Rebel Army which 
was the military wing of the 26th of July Movement from 
its early struggle in the Sierra Maestra to the conflict-
defining battle of Santa Clara, and eventual victory in 
January 1959. Guevara, despite being an entry-level recruit 
to the Rebel Army was highly educated and one of the 
posts he took up in the revolutionary government was that 
of head of the department of industry of the national 
institute of agrarian reform – a position of utmost 
influence to the food industry and one that the 
revolutionary government considered so important that it 
required the attention of the third-ranking officer in the 
entire Rebel Army (Castro, 1994).
Guevara speaks much of nutrition in his books. As a 
medical doctor, he knew the essentials and was quick to 
instil good practices into the cadres under his command. 
He wrote at length about the need for guerrilla fighters to 
carry fat, salt, sugar and preserved foods as well as the 
basics for cooking foods (Guevara 1969, p. 83):
…always it is necessary to assure a supply of the 
fundamental food for the troop as well as some 
kinds of fat which permit better food preparation; 
these may be animal or vegetable fats.
The thrust of Guevara’s (1969) nutritional advice was 
that as the guerrilla fighter may be isolated without food 
sources from time to time, it was essential to carry extra 
foodstuffs and have knowledge of how to extract the 
maximum benefit from them. A warning to combatants 
was framed thus: ‘…He (the guerrilla fighter) cannot count 
on more than two or three friendly houses that will provide 
food…’ (p.36). ‘The guerrilla fighter ought always to carry 
some personal food besides that which the troop carries or 
consumes in its camps’ (p.51).
In regard to safeguarding supplies he adds (Guevara 
1969. p.29):
For all lines of supply that pass through the 
country, it is necessary to have a series of houses, 
terminals, or way-stations, where supplies may be 
hidden during the day while waiting to be moved by 
night. Only those directly in charge of the food 
supplies should know these houses.
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the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Named after the father of modern 
Vietnam and Communist leader of North Vietnam, the 
trail was used for decades by both the People’s Liberation 
Armed Forces (P.L.A.F.) and the Khmer Rouges. 
The Vietnamese were fighting to re-unite Communist 
North Vietnam with the American-backed South. The 
country was divided by a de-militarised zone (DMZ) which 
made Northern infiltration to the south problematic 
meaning that moving guerrillas and war materials and 
foodstuffs was extremely difficult.
The Khmer Rouges were fighting a war against the right-
wing American-backed Cambodian government led by the 
Royal family. The Khmer Rouges and the NLF were 
originally part of the wider Indo-Chinese Communist 
Party which had fought against the French colonial 
government and after independence, with the re-
establishment of the two Vietnams, Cambodia and Laos 
concentrated their efforts on national issues.
The problem that both groups had was that each had 
different competing global sponsors; Vietnam were backed 
by the Soviet Union but obviously had no border with 
them. The Khmer Rouges were backed by Red China and 
had no border with them.
Therefore Chinese assistance to The Khmer Rouges had 
to go through Vietnam, and Soviet assistance to Vietnam 
had to be flown direct to North Vietnam or go through 
Chinese territorial land or waters. This made for difficulty 
in an already confusing situation. The short term solution 
for both was to co-operate in the spirit of common 
anti-imperialism. 
The trail started in North Vietnam and wound its way 
through the heavily forested mountains crossing into Laos 
and Cambodia eventually supplying bases near the 
Vietnamese border, and from then the bases supplied the 
frontline guerrillas in the Western jungles of Vietnam. 
The Khmer Rouges had long been the junior partners in 
the alliance and had did not have the luxury of a hinterland 
to supply them. Their experiences in the jungle war led 
them to eat almost anything including elephants, tigers, 
wild dogs, monkeys and even moths (Short 2005, p. 146).
Food was a constant pre-occupation; the lack of 
protein drove us to frenzied efforts at farming or 
hunting whenever it was feasible.
One cadre referred to smoked elephant meat as their only 
source of protein. The same guerrilla recalled a cooked 
chicken being shared by thirty people in a jungle camp.
The trail was a constant target for American B-52 
bombers and the continual attempts to disrupt the supply 
chain affected Vietnamese and Cambodians alike. Pol Pot, 
the Khmer Rouges leader, was returning from a meeting in 
the North Vietnamese capital, Hanoi and it took four 
months; twice the usual time because of American bombing 
raids and search-and-destroy missions (Short, 2005). 
diary entries from that campaign show a strong similarity 
to the campaign waged in Cuba.
The Bolivian campaign was marked by smaller numbers 
of participants and perhaps due to this, the daily struggle 
to eat seems more marked. The column under Guevara’s 
command became separated from their rear-guard and they 
spent months trying to re-establish contact. The food issue 
was always acute and at some points it seems as if the 
strategic goals were being set aside in the simple hunt for 
food and evading capture by the army.
Guevara speaks of these daily struggles candidly; he 
describes slaughtering a horse and making Charqui (jerky) 
out of the leftovers, and also describes catching and eating a 
tátu (Armadillo) and this being consumed by the group. 
The guerrillas lived mostly on peasant staples such as Mote 
which is a kind of porridge made from cereal grains cooked 
in the husk, or locro which was made from pork, rice, root 
vegetables and potatoes, when they were lucky. Other foods 
used were quechua soup, which consists of charqui, rice and 
vegetables, again this is a staple in Bolivia. On another 
occasion a soup was concocted from peanuts with hearts of 
palm cooked in lard.
The diary gives a daily update on the food situation and 
on March 18th 1967, he reports that they shot an Urina 
which is a deer-like creature and so they ate well. On May 
21st he records that they ate ‘extravagantly’ – stew, corn, 
charqui and mote. They also ate a tapir and typically used 
all their resources to feed themselves utilising mussels from 
rivers and of course fish. This contrasts to March 14th when 
he glumly reports that they have eaten the last of their food. 
These accounts differ hugely from the perception – 
eloquently outlined by Guevara’s comrade Inti Peredo that 
(Guevara 1994, p. 356):
The erroneous impression exists that the guerrilla 
sits comfortably at his camp, sleeping in a 
hammock, eating a little bit; then a battle is 
planned, there is an encounter with the army, the 
dead and wounded are retrieved, and one returns to 
camp to rest up.
The idealised view of the guerrilla existence would 
appear to be far from the truth. Guevara’s campaign ends 
on October 8th when he is wounded and captured in a 
firefight and then executed the next day. In the days before 
he died his diary records many expressions of thirst and a 
reference to dinner of corn meal and tapir meat, a poor 
ending for any venture.
The jungle-based revolutionary wars of South-East Asia 
are treated with differing approaches. Much is known of the 
conflict in Vietnam – due to the American involvement but 
much less is known about the Cambodian conflict which 
ran simultaneously during the 1960’s and 1970’s. 
Nevertheless these neighbours fought jungle wars at the 
same time and before a disastrous split between them, 
shared many resources including perhaps the most well-
known supply chain ever used by armed insurgents that is 
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today we are seeing what is being called the counter-cuisine 
(Naccarato & Lebesco, 2012):
…the gradual effect of counter-cuisine insinuating 
itself into mainstream food culture perhaps 
showing that revolution sometimes relies on 
evolution…
The revolutions of the future may be about food and not 
reliant on it. 
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Halliday, 2005).  The food provisioning of this many people 
was an almost impossible feat and this is borne out by the 
fact that only 10% of the combat troops survived the march. 
The Red Army endured much hardship and the descriptions 
of eating horses to the bone and chewing the leather from 
their belts and even eating moss from trees give insight to 
the food shortages (Chang & Halliday, 2005).
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that the Communist leadership would avoid capture and 
was a success in those terms, yet the accounts from the 
march speak of constant hunger and food shortages.
Conclusion
The business of armed insurrection is a dangerous one and 
failure to provision adequately leaves the entire 
undertaking in jeopardy. The successful armed revolutions 
are those that plan for food shortages accordingly. The 
commandeering of foodstuffs has been a widespread 
practice and the offering of payment either in hard 
currency or promissory notes will ameliorate the loss to the 
agricultural producer somewhat. This is necessary for the 
revolution to convey legitimacy in the eyes of the populace. 
The more successful the revolution, the better the planning 
and it is plain that very successful movements such as the 
Vietnamese paid as much attention to food as they did to 
munitions.
In 2016 perhaps food and revolution will have a 
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